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NOTE

HATE CRIMES-New Limits on the Scope of First Amendment Protection? Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
I.

INTRODUCTION

On June 11, 1993, the United States Supreme Court delivered a
unanimous decision upholding the constitutionality of "hate crime" penalty-enhancement statutes in Wisconsin v. Mitchell.1 While such legislation has been applauded for addressing the increasing number of biasmotivated crimes,' it has also received sharp criticism. Detractors argue
that such statutes violate the First Amendment by effectively punishing
pure thought, and by being overbroad, having the effect of "chilling"
free thought and speech.'
This Note provides a synopsis of the facts and procedural holdings of
this case and earlier cases forming the groundwork for the Court's decision. An evaluation and analysis of the decision follows, commenting on
the wisdom of the ruling, the impact on similar present and future statutes, and the appropriateness of such statutes in responding to bias-motivated crime.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Respondent Todd Mitchell was convicted of aggravated battery for
his part in a group attack on a young boy.4 Because the jury determined
that Mitchell had intentionally selected his victim on the basis of the
1. 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993), rev'g 169 Vis. 2d 153, 485 N.W.2d 807 (1992).
2. State v. Mitchell, 169 Wis. 2d 153, 161, 485 N.W.2d 807, 810 (1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct.
2194 (1993) (citing Joseph M. Fernandez, Bringing Hate Crime Into Focus-The Hate Crime
Statistics Act of 1990, 26 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. RE-v. 261 (1991); Tanya Kateri Hernandez, Bias
Crimes: Unconscious Racism in the Prosecutionof Racially Motivated Violence, 99 YALE L.J.
845, 845-46 (1990)).
3. See Susan Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put You in Jail, But Can Words Increase
Your Sentence? Constitutionaland Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation Laws, 39 UCLA
L. Rnv. 333 (1991).
4. Mitchell, 169 Wis. 2d at 157, 485 N.W.2d at 809. Mitchell and others, all African-Americans, were discussing a scene from the movie MississippiBurning, in which an African-American child is beaten by a white man. Apparently inspired, Mitchell asked the group, "Do you
all feel hyped up to move on some white people?" and directed the group to attack a young
white boy who happened to pass on the other side of the street. Id. at 158-59, 485 N.W.2d at
809.
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boy's race, Mitchell's sentence was increased pursuant to the Wisconsin
hate crime penalty-enhancement statute.5

Failing to receive post-conviction relief in the circuit court, Mitchell
appealed, challenging the First Amendment constitutionality of his con-6
viction and sentence and claiming that the statute was overbroad.
Mitchell also argued that the statute was vague and violated his equal
protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.7 The court of ap-

peals rejected these challenges and found that Mitchell had waived any
equal protection claim.8 The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, holding that "[t]he statute is directed solely at the subjective motivation of
the actor-his or her prejudice. Punishment of one's thought, however
repugnant the thought, is unconstitutional." 9
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, citing the im-

portance of the issue as well as the conflict of opinion among state
courts. 10 The Court determined that the statute was a constitutionally

legitimate objective for the state legislature and was neither overbroad
nor inconsistent with the Court's earlier decisions regarding First
Amendment protection."
III.

BACKGROUND OF THE LAW

Most state hate crime laws, including Wisconsin's,' 2 follow a penalty5. Id. at 159, 485 N.W.2d at 809. The relevant parts of the statute are as follows:
939.645 Penalty; crimes committed against certain people or property.
(1) If a person does all of the following, the penalties for the underlying crime are
increased as provided in sub. (2):
(a) Commits a crime under chs. 939 to 948.
(b) Intentionally selects the person against whom the crime under par. (a) is
committed or selects the property which is damaged or otherwise affected by the crime
under par. (a) in whole or in part because of the actor's belief or perception regarding
the race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry of that
person or the owner or occupant of that property, whether or not the actor's belief or
perception was correct. ...
(4) This section does not apply to any crime if proof of race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry or proof of any person's perception
or belief regarding another's race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national
origin or ancestry is required for a conviction for that crime.
Wis. STAT. § 939.645 (1991-92).
6. Mitchell, 169 Wis. 2d at 159-60, 485 N.W.2d at 809-10.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 160, 485 N.W.2d at 810.
9. Id. at 170, 485 N.W.2d at 814.
10. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2198 (1993).
11. Id. at 2202.
12. Mitchell, 169 Wis. 2d at 165, 485 N.W.2d at 812.
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enhancement model drafted by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai
B'rith.13 However, until the Court granted certiorari in Mitchell, no ruling by the Court addressed the constitutionality of hate crime penaltyenhancement statutes.' 4 As a result, much of the background law is
found in related areas of First Amendment protection.
The Supreme Court has long held that while one's expressions of personal opinion are protected by the First Amendment, exceptions may
exist when such viewpoints motivate criminal conduct. Almost fifty
years ago, the Court ruled on the admissibility of a defendant's personal
views for the offense of treason in Haupt v. United States. 5 Haupt was
convicted for harboring his son, a German spy, and obtaining an automobile and employment for him. 6 The Court ruled that Haupt's prior
statements of allegiance to Germany could be weighed by the jury in
determining whether Haupt's actions were those of7 a father simply aiding his son or those of furthering a spy's mission.'
More recently, the Court permitted the consideration of a person's
views during sentencing in Barclay v. Florida.8 Whereas Haupt concerned the constitutional permissibility of using evidence of a defendant's motivation in order to prove a crime had been committed, 19 the
Court in Barclay upheld a trial judge's determination to impose the
death penalty because of the defendant's racial biases when committing
13. Gellman, supra note 3, at 335. The full text of the revised model statute is as follows:
Intimidation
A. A person commits the crime of intimidation if, by reason of the actual or
perceived race, color, religion, national origin or sexual orientation of another individual or group of individuals, he violates Section - of the Penal Code [insert code provision for criminal trespass, criminal mischief, harassment, menacing, assault and/or any
other appropriate statutorily proscribed criminal conduct].
B. Intimidation is a - misdemeanor/felony [the degree of criminal liability
should be made contingent upon the severity of the injury incurred or the property lost
or damaged].
CivIL RIGS Div., ADL LEGAL AFFAIRS DEP'T, ADL LAW REPORT: HATE CRIMES STATuiTEs: A REsPONSE TO ANTI-SEMrIsM, VANDALISM, AND VIOLENT BIGOTRY 1, app. (1988 &
Supp. 1990).
14. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
15. 330 U.S. 631 (1946). The standard of evidence for treason is found in Article III, § 3
of the Constitution: "the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act." Id. at 636.
16. Id. at 634.
17. Id. at 641-42. The Court noted further that such testimony must be "scrutinized with
care to be certain the statements are not expressions of mere lawful and permissible difference
of opinion with our own government or quite proper appreciation of the land of birth." Id. at
642.
18. 463 U.S. 939 (1983).
19. Haupt,330 U.S. at 641-42.
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the crime.2 0 Despite a Florida statute expressly forbidding the consider-

ation of a defendant's viewpoints as an aggravating circumstance, the
Court determined that there was nothing constitutionally wrong in doing
so.2 1 The Court stated that "[w]hat is important .. is an individualized
determination on the basis of the character of the individual and the
circumstances of the crime.

'

However, the Court has imposed limits on when a defendant's personal viewpoints may be considered in sentencing. In Dawson v. Delaware,23 the Court declared unconstitutional the admittance of evidence

that the defendant was a member of the Aryan Brotherhood, when the
crime the defendant committed could not be shown to have been racially
motivated.24 The Court ruled that allowing evidence of a defendant's
"abstract beliefs" in sentencing directly violated the First Amendment
when those beliefs had no relevance to the issue being tried.'
Additionally, the Court has generally rejected attempts to criminalize
behavior that would be acceptable if it were not for the defendant's motivation for engaging in a specific activity. In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,2 6
the Court struck down a city ordinance that made it a misdemeanor to
display a symbol "which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know
arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color,
creed, religion or gender."'2 7 The City of St. Paul argued that the statute

was aimed at "fighting words" that may be constitutionally proscribed
20. Barclay, 463 U.S. at 949. Barclay, an African-American, was convicted in the murder
of a white hitchhiker. Evidence revealed that Barclay was a member of the Black Liberation
Army and intended to start a "race war." Id. at 942 (citation omitted).
21. Id. at 956. The Court justified this apparent disregard for state law by stating that
"mere errors of state law are not the concern of this Court unless they rise for some other
reason to the level of a denial of rights protected by the United States Constitution." Id. at
957-58 (citation omitted). The dissent in this case pointedly observed that the decision to
sentence a person to death based on evidence impermissible under state law is "constitutional
error that cannot be harmless." Id. at 984 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 958 (citing Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983)).
23. 112 S. Ct. 1093 (1992). Dawson, a white male, was convicted in the murder of a white
woman after escaping from prison. Id. at 1095.
24. Id. at 1097. The Aryan Brotherhood was defined in the proceedings as "a white racist
prison gang that began... in response to other gangs of racial minorities." Id. at 1096.
25. Id. at 1098. The Court held that membership in the Aryan Brotherhood "cannot be
viewed as relevant 'bad' character evidence in its own right." Id. at 1099. This is in contrast to
Barclay, where such evidence was permitted even though it was against state law. See supra
notes 20-21 and accompanying text. As the dissent in Dawson points out, Delaware law expressly permits all relevant evidence relating to the character of the defendant once a statutory
aggravating factor is found. Dawson, 112 S. Ct. at 1100 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
26. 112 S.Ct. 2538 (1992).
27. Id. at 2541 (citing ST. PAUL BIAS-MOTIVATED CRIME ORDINANCE, ST. PAUL, MINN.
LEGIs. CODE § 292.02 (1990)).
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under the First Amendment. 28 Nevertheless, because the statute in

question proscribed only certain kinds of bias-motivated conduct, the
Court found that the ordinance violated the rule against content discrimination.2 9 Therefore, while cognizant of the intent of the ordinance, the

Court held it unconstitutional because "[a]n ordinance not limited to 30the
favored topics ...would have precisely the same beneficial effect.
Antidiscrimination laws, however, are an exception to the general
rule that legal activity cannot be criminalized on the basis of personal
viewpoints protected under the First Amendment.3 In Roberts v.
United States Jaycees,3 2 the Court upheld a Minnesota statute that forbade the denial of full and equal use of public accommodations "because

of race, color, creed, religion, disability, national origin or sex."'33 The
Court determined that such statutes are a legitimate means for the state
to protect its citizens from "serious social and personal harms. ' 34 Therefore, the Court found that the statute addressed legitimate concerns of
28. Id. at 2542. "Fighting words" were defined by the Supreme Court as those words
"which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,571-72 (1942). The Court noted that the
reason "fighting words" are excluded from First Amendment protection is "not [because]
their content communicates any particular idea, but that their content embodies a particularly
intolerable (and socially unnecessary) mode of expressing whatever idea the speaker wishes to
convey." R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2548-49.
29. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2550. An example of content-discrimination was given by the
Court: "[Tihe government may proscribe libel; but it may not make the further content discrimination of proscribing only libel critical of the government." Id. at 2543. The Court elaborates that the prohibition of content discrimination avoids raising "the specter that the
Government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace." Id. at
2545 (citations omitted).
30. Id. at 2550.
31. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S.Ct. 2194, 2200 (1993). Whether antidiscrimination
statutes actually punish motive, as the U.S. Supreme Court has held, or conduct remains a
contentious issue. The majority opinion by the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that "[u]nder
antidiscrimination statutes, it is the discriminatory act which is prohibited. Under the hate
crimes statute, the 'selection' which is punished is not an act, it is a mental process." State v.
Mitchell, 169 Wis. 2d 153, 176, 485 N.W.2d 807, 816 (1992), rev'd, 113 S.Ct. 2194 (1993).
32. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
33. AL at 615 (citing Mn,'. STAT. § 363.03(3) (1982)). The statute was challenged by the
United States Jaycees in response to the Minneapolis and St. Paul chapters of the Jaycees who
had been admitting women as members in violation of the Jaycees' bylaws. Id. at 614.
34. Id. at 625. The Court noted that:
[D]iscrimination based on archaic and overbroad assumptions about the relative needs
and capacities of the sexes forces individuals to labor under stereotypical notions that
often bear no relationship to their actual abilities. It thereby both deprives persons of
their individual dignity and denies society the benefits of wide participation in political,
economic, and cultural life.
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the state and abridged protected speech no more than necessary to meet
that state's goals."

Finally, the Court concluded that discrimination,

"like violence or other types of potentially expressive activities that produce special harms distinct from their communicative impact... [is] entitled to no constitutional protection."3 6

IV.

EVALUATION OF THE CASE

Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Wisconsin v. Mitchell is brief in
its reversal of the Wisconsin Supreme Court decision. The opinion focused on three challenges made to the Wisconsin statute: (1) by punishing merely what the legislature has found to be offensive thought, the
statute violates the First Amendment; (2) by requiring evidence of a defendant's speech prior to the offense, the statute would have a "chilling
effect" on free speech, making the statute unconstitutionally overbroad;

and (3) by punishing the subjective selection of a victim based on his or
her protected status rather than an objective act of discrimination, the
statute differs from antidiscrimination laws. 37
The Court first determined that it was not bound by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court's conclusion that the statute punishes a defendant's
thought rather than conduct. 38 Conceding that the Court is bound by a

state court's construction of a state statute, the Court nonetheless found
that the statute had not been construed in terms of defining a particular
word or phrase. Instead, "[the Wisconsin Supreme Court] merely characterized the 'practical effect' of the statute for First Amendment pur-

poses. ' 39 Therefore, the Court concluded that it could form its own
35. Id. at 628.
36. Id. (emphasis added).
37. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194,2197-98 (1993). The Court declined to address
the Fourteenth Amendment challenges made by Mitchell (i.e., the statute is vague and violates equal protection) because the challenges were "not developed below and plainly fall
outside of the question on which we granted certiorari." Id. at 2197 n.2. However, the opening statement of the opinion declared to resolve "whether this penalty enhancement [statute]
is prohibited by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. We hold that it is not." Id. at 2196
(emphasis added). Furthermore, the Court stated that it granted certiorari "because of the
importance of the question presented and the existence of a conflict of authority among state
high courts on the constitutionality of statutes similar to Wisconsin's penalty-enhancement
provision." Id. at 2198. Therefore, it appears that although the Fourteenth Amendment challenges were not addressed by the Court, they are not seen to pose a serious threat to the
statute's constitutionality.
38. Id. at 2198-99.
39. Id. at 2198. The Wisconsin Supreme Court had stated:
Merely because the statute refers in a literal sense to the intentional "conduct" of selecting, does not mean the Court must turn a blind eye to the intent and practical effect
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assessment of the statute's operative consequences, namely that the statute literally punishes only conduct.4 Nevertheless, because the statute
carries increased penalties for crimes motivated by a defendant's discriminatory viewpoint, the Court decided to refine and elaborate on the
kind of coverage ascribed to the First Amendment.4 1

The Court observed that its prior holdings attest that "[t]he First
Amendment does not protect violence."'42

Additionally, the Court

noted that judges consider numerous factors, including motive,4 3 when
sentencing a defendant, and that many states consider the commission of
a capital offense for pecuniary gain to be a separate statutory aggravating circumstance." Therefore, although evidence may not be admitted
merely to prove a defendant's unpopular or offensive viewpoints, "the
Constitution does not erect a per se barrier to the admission of evidence
concerning one's beliefs and associations at sentencing simply because
those beliefs and associations are protected by the First Amendment."'4 5
The Court used this line of reasoning to distinguish its decision in
Barclay, which permitted evidence of racial animus to be used in sentencing,46 from the decision in Dawson, where the defendant's beliefs
(although repugnant) were held to be unrelated to the crime.4 7 While

neither case dealt with a specific penalty-enhancement provision, the
Court argued that defendants who receive the death penalty because of
their racial prejudice surely receive "the most severe 'enhancement' of

all."4 8 Concluding, the Court declared that state legislatures have the
of the law - punishment of offensive motive or thought. The conduct of "selecting" is
not akin to the conduct of assaulting, burglarizing, murdering and other criminal conduct. It cannot be objectively established. Rather, an examination of the intentional
"selection" of a victim necessarily requires a subjective examination of the actor's motive or reason for singling out the particular person against whom he or she commits a
crime.
State v. Mitchell, 169 Wis. 2d 153, 166-68, 485 N.W.2d 807, 813 (1992) (footnote omitted),
rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
40. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2199. It would appear that the U.S. Supreme Court
ignored the Wisconsin Supreme Court majority's reasoning. However, two justices from the
Wisconsin court also found that the statute simply punished discriminatory conduct and not
mere thought. Mitchell, 169 Wis. 2d at 181, 485 N.W.2d at 819 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting);
Id. at 184, 485 N.W.2d at 820 (Bablitch, J., dissenting).
41. See Mitchell, 113 S.Ct. at 2199.
42. Id. (citing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982)).
43. 11
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2200 (citing Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 1094 (1992)).
46. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
47. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
48. Mitchell, 113 S.Ct. at 2200. While the analogy may ring true, there still remains the
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primary responsibility for fixing criminal penalties.4 9

The Court rejected the argument that the statute is unconstitutionally
overbroad because of its "chilling effect" on free speech.50 The Court
found that the chill conceived here is "far more attenuated and unlikely"
than typical overbreadth cases. 51 Dismissing the possibility that a person
would ever be charged under the statute for minor misdemeanor of-

fenses,52 the Court was left with "the prospect of a citizen suppressing
his bigoted beliefs for fear that evidence of such beliefs will be introduced against him at trial if he commits a more serious offense against
person or property."53 This, the Court determined, was simply too speculative to merit consideration.5 4

Finally, the Court held that there was no real difference between the
Wisconsin statute and federal and state antidiscrimination laws. The

Court compared Title VII, which makes it unlawful for an employer to
discriminate against an employee "because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin,"55 with the Wisconsin statute.56
The Court then distinguished R.A.V. as concerning an impermissible ordinance because it was directed only at particular symbols that the city
found offensive.57
The Court concluded that the Wisconsin statute punishes bias-motifact that Mitchell dealt with an actual penalty enhancement provision for hate crimes, while
Dawson and Barclay did not. The Court acknowledges this, but insists the analogy is sufficient. Id.
49. Id. In addition, "the fact that the Wisconsin Legislature has decided, as a general
matter, that bias-motivated offenses warrant greater maximum penalties across the board
does not alter the result here." Id.
50. Id. at 2201.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. The majority opinion of the Wisconsin Supreme Court raises the point that a
person may commit a misdemeanor yet end up convicted of a felony by merely adding a racial
insult: "Obviously, the state would respond that the speech is merely an indication that [the
person] intentionally selected [the victim] because of his particular race or ethnicity, but the
fact remains that the necessity to use speech to prove this intentional selection threatens to
chill free speech." State v. Mitchell, 169 Wis. 2d 153, 174, 485 N.W.2d 807, 816 (1992), rev'd,
113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993). It has also been suggested that "[a]nyone charged with one of the
underlying offenses could be charged with ethnic intimidation as well, and face the possibility
of public scrutiny of a lifetime of everything from ethnic jokes to serious intellectual inquiry.
Awareness of this possibility could lead to habitual self-censorship ... ." Gellman, supranote
3, at 360.
54. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2201.
55. Id. at 2200 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)).
56. See supra note 5 ("because of the actor's belief or perception regarding the race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin, or ancestry" (emphasis added)).
57. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2200-01; see also supra notes 28-29.
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vated crimes more severely because those crimes are more likely to
cause greater societal and individual harm.5" This "provides an adequate
explanation for its penalty-enhancement provision over and above mere
disagreement with offenders' beliefs or biases." 59

V. ANALYSIS
The decision in Wisconsin v. Mitchell should be followed. Although
the Court's reasoning was not always clear, the decision flowed naturally
from established precedent and, despite appearances, was not a step
closer to legitimizing the punishment of "thought crimes." While the
decision will have broad effects on similar state statutes, the effect on
bias-motivated crime may be negligible.
Initially, the Court's opinion failed to find solid ground upon which it
could base its reasoning. While declaring that it is not bound by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court's interpretation that the statute punishes motive, the Court acknowledged that the statute may indirectly punish motive as well as conduct.60
The Court then attempted to compare Mitchell, a case concerning the
constitutionality of a penalty-enhancement provision, with Barclay and
Dawson, both of which pertain to the consideration of a defendant's personal biases relevant to the crime during sentencing.6 The Court analogized Mitchell to Barclay and Dawson by stating that using a defendant's
personal views as a reason to sentence him or her to death is the greatest
"enhancement" of all.6' However, the Court did not explain how having
the option to give a defendant a greater penalty based on his or her personal views is the same as being requiredto do so by state law (provided
the jury convicts the defendant under the penalty-enhancement statute).
Perhaps realizing that the analogy is not precise, the Court deferred to
state legislatures the decision of whether to assign stricter penalties to
bias-motivated crimes.6 3

58. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2201. The Court related that bias-related crimes are "more
likely to provoke retaliatory crimes, inflict distinct emotional harms on their victims, and incite community unrest." Id. (citations omitted); see also Gellman, supra note 3, at 341 ("Minority group children are particularly vulnerable, exhibiting self-hatred early and coming to

question their own intelligence, competence, and worth.").
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2201.
See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 20-21, 23-25 and accompanying text.
See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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Up to this point, the Court's reasoning lacked direction. The strongest part of the opinion, and the part that most closely follows precedent,
was the Court's comparison of hate crime penalty-enhancement statutes
with antidiscrimination laws. The Court stated that "motive plays the
same role under the Wisconsin statute as it does under federal and state
antidiscrimination laws, which we have previously upheld against constitutional challenge." 64
This comparison not only gave the Court solid precedent, but also
allowed it to bypass some of the pitfalls of acknowledging that the statute may punish motive to some degree. The Court has previously held
that violent acts, like discrimination, are not entitled to constitutional
protection merely because they may have some expressive content. 65
Further, both bias-motivated crimes and discrimination are "thought to
inflict greater individual and societal harm, "166 giving thste
the state adequate
justification for attempting to redress these crimes.67

This comparison also avoided inferences that the statute punishes
"thought crimes" by punishing merely bigoted thought, or that the statute is overbroad and chills free speech. By focusing on the discriminatory act (whether it is in denying a person certain rights or selecting a
victim for a crime based on personal bias) rather than the viewpoint itself, the statute punishes personal viewpoints only indirectly, that is,
when they motivate illegal conduct.68 Furthermore, because most people presumably do not commit violent crimes, but do engage in activities
(such as employment) subject to antidiscrimination laws, penalty-enhancement statutes would arguably appear to have less of a chilling effect on free speech than antidiscrimination laws.
The opinion proposed to resolve conflicts among state authorities
over whether hate crime penalty-enhancement statutes similar to Wisconsin's are constitutional. Therefore, it is expected that most present
and future statutes based on the Anti-Defamation League's model will

64. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2200 (1993).
65. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984); see also supra notes 31-36
and accompanying text.
66. See supra note 58.
67. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
68. One of the dissenting justices in the Wisconsin Supreme Court decision agreed, noting: "These are laws against discrimination, pure and simple.... What the statute does punish is acting upon those thoughts. It punishes the act of discriminatory selection plus criminal
conduct, not the thought or expression of bigotry." State v. Mitchell, 169 Wis. 2d 153, 183-84,
485 N.W.2d 807, 820 (1992) (Bablitch, J., dissenting), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
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be upheld against a First Amendment challenge. 69 Constitutional barriers will arise only if the statutes punish otherwise legal acts for biasmotivation (which do not fall under antidiscrimination laws) or if the
statute is in some way content-discriminatory, 70 perhaps by punishing
only specific crimes more severely or protecting only certain classes of
people. In contrast, under the Wisconsin statute, presumably anyone
could be a victim.
Realistically, the statute may not be very effective in eradicating biasrelated crimes. While antidiscrimination laws may not eliminate bigotry,
at least such laws offer potential victims reasonable protection from the
denial of their rights. In contrast, hate crime penalty-enhancement statutes do little for the victim, other than perhaps affording him or her a
greater sense of justice. 71 Additionally, while people may be reluctant to
subject themselves to penalties for discriminating while engaged in
otherwise legal activity, it does not seem likely that a person will be deterred from bias-motivated violent crime simply by the presence of a
penalty-enhancement statute. 72
Certainly, a more positive and productive route to eliminating bigotry would be through education. By having hate crime penalty-enhancement statutes in place, however, there is at least the symbolic
reassurance that hate crimes will not be tolerated in this country.7 3
VI.

CONCLUSION

The increasing number of bias-motivated crimes clearly presents a
problem of national significance. The United States Supreme Court attempted to address this issue in Wisconsin v. Mitchell. By focusing on
the similarity between antidiscrimination laws and hate crime statutes,
the Court was able to uphold the constitutionality of hate crime laws
based on precedent while avoiding the pitfalls of appearing to legitimize
crimes based purely on a person's thoughts or beliefs. Rather than ex69. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text. The Court also hints that the statute
would withstand Fourteenth Amendment attacks as well. See supra note 37.
70. See supra note 29.
71. In Mitchell, the boy who was beaten suffered extensive injuries, remaining in a coma
for four days and possibly suffering permanent brain damage. Mitchell, 169 Wis. 2d at 159,485
N.W.2d at 809.
72. One author noted that "[tihere has been no showing of a decrease or slowed increase
in bigotry or bigotry-related crime in jurisdictions where such laws exist." Gellman, supra
note 3, at 388.
73. Id. at 368-69.
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pand upon or create new limits on First Amendment protection, the
Court has only drawn the lines a little more clearly.
BRIAN RESLER

